<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Evidence-Led AI by Leo Liu]]></title><description><![CDATA[Evidence-Led AI by Leo Liu]]></description><link>https://leoautomotiveai.hashnode.dev</link><generator>RSS for Node</generator><lastBuildDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 15:03:06 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://leoautomotiveai.hashnode.dev/rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><ttl>60</ttl><item><title><![CDATA[Everything Becomes Callable: An Evidence Contract for Agent Plugins]]></title><description><![CDATA[AI agent systems are moving away from fixed applications and toward runtime composition. A single workflow can call search, read a document, invoke a specialist Skill, connect to an MCP server, and ha]]></description><link>https://leoautomotiveai.hashnode.dev/everything-becomes-callable-an-evidence-contract-for-agent-plugins</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://leoautomotiveai.hashnode.dev/everything-becomes-callable-an-evidence-contract-for-agent-plugins</guid><category><![CDATA[ai agents]]></category><category><![CDATA[mcp]]></category><category><![CDATA[Open Source]]></category><category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Leo Liu]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 10:37:50 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>AI agent systems are moving away from fixed applications and toward runtime composition. A single workflow can call search, read a document, invoke a specialist Skill, connect to an MCP server, and hand the result to a human for acceptance.</p>
<p>That is why I use the phrase <strong>everything becomes a plugin</strong>. I do not mean that every capability will share one package format. I mean that useful business capabilities are becoming modular, discoverable, and callable through Skills, MCP servers, APIs, platform plugins, and workflows.</p>
<p>The exciting part is composition. The dangerous part is assuming that discoverable means trustworthy.</p>
<h2>Popularity is discovery, not evidence</h2>
<p>Stars, installs, likes, and author descriptions are helpful when deciding what to inspect. They do not answer the questions that matter during a real task:</p>
<ul>
<li>Which exact version was tested?</li>
<li>In which environment did it run?</li>
<li>What could it read or write?</li>
<li>Where did the data go?</li>
<li>What acceptance criteria were used?</li>
<li>Which failures or human interventions occurred?</li>
<li>Is the evidence still current?</li>
</ul>
<p>A popular Skill may fail on a conflicted meeting note. An MCP server may connect successfully but produce an unusable business result. A low-permission tool may still be inaccurate, while an effective tool may request more access than the task justifies.</p>
<p>Popularity, security observations, compatibility, and task effectiveness are different axes. Collapsing them into one score hides risk.</p>
<h2>A minimal evidence contract</h2>
<p>For every agent capability, I want four evidence blocks.</p>
<h3>1. Provenance and version</h3>
<p>Record the maintainer, source, revision or package version, content digest when practical, and license or redistribution basis. If the identity of the evaluated artifact is ambiguous, a passing result becomes meaningless as soon as the project changes.</p>
<h3>2. Permissions and data destinations</h3>
<p>State what the capability can read, write, execute, install, or send over the network. Name external services that receive data and any additional account or administrator approval required.</p>
<p>Documentation can describe requested permissions, but it cannot enforce them. Actual authorization belongs to the host, the service, and the user.</p>
<h3>3. Task, environment, and result</h3>
<p>“Works” is not a test report. Record the task definition, input boundary, acceptance criteria, host and model versions, dependencies, sample size, human interventions, time basis, cost basis, and every observed failure.</p>
<p>Keep the states separate:</p>
<ul>
<li>static validation;</li>
<li>installation;</li>
<li>successful execution;</li>
<li>target-side readback;</li>
<li>human acceptance.</li>
</ul>
<p>A green checkmark should never silently merge these stages.</p>
<h3>4. Recency and invalidation</h3>
<p>Every result needs a date and an invalidation rule. A change in the Skill, MCP server, model, host, dependency, permission scope, or test scenario may require a retest.</p>
<p>This matters especially for enterprise delivery teams. They are not selecting a tool once; they are maintaining a changing system.</p>
<h2>Security and usefulness require different tests</h2>
<p>A static scan can identify some suspicious patterns, but it cannot prove universal safety. A sandboxed run can show behavior under specific controls, but it cannot prove the absence of hidden behavior elsewhere.</p>
<p>Likewise, a task test can show that a defined workflow met predetermined criteria on a defined sample. It does not become a universal quality score.</p>
<p>The useful discipline is simple: name the evidence type, preserve its boundary, and leave unknowns visible.</p>
<h2>A first-party implementation experiment</h2>
<p>I created the open-source <a href="https://github.com/leo2026888/agent-catalog-seed">Agent Catalog Seed</a> to make this evidence model concrete. It contains a versioned schema for provenance, requested permissions, compatibility, evaluation status, conflicts, and rights; a synthetic non-installable example; an evaluation-report template that retains failures and unknowns; and governance guidance.</p>
<p>It is an open-source starting point, not a live marketplace. The public Skill has passed static format validation, but it has not received an independent real-edit evaluation or broad cross-host compatibility testing. There is no independent security certification, verified platform-partner program, real-user rating system, or validated commercial model.</p>
<p>Those gaps are not marketing footnotes. They are exactly what an evidence system should keep visible.</p>
<h2>What this enables</h2>
<p>An evidence-aware registry can do more than list links. It can help teams:</p>
<ul>
<li>monitor versions of the capabilities they rely on;</li>
<li>rerun customer-task regression checks after changes;</li>
<li>maintain allowlists with owners and review status;</li>
<li>distinguish compatibility from effectiveness;</li>
<li>flag when an old result has become “retest required.”</li>
</ul>
<p>The long-term vision is that everything becomes callable. The near-term discipline is less glamorous: identify the exact artifact, state the permissions, test a defined task, preserve failures, and repeat when the system changes.</p>
<p>That is how a plugin ecosystem becomes useful before it becomes large.</p>
<hr />
<p><em>Disclosure: I initiated and maintain Agent Catalog Seed. This article is a first-party project update and received AI assistance in drafting and editing. I reviewed the final claims. No sponsor paid for this article.</em></p>
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